A coup d'état in Athens in
November 1973 had made Brigadier
General Dimitrios Ioannides leader
of the junta. Rigidly anticommunist,
Ioannides had served on Cyprus in
the 1960s with the National Guard.
His experiences convinced him that
Makarios should be removed from office
because of domestic leftist support
and his visits to communist capitals.
During the spring of 1974, Cypriot
intelligence found evidence that
EOKA B was planning a coup and was
being supplied, controlled, and funded
by the military government in Athens.
EOKA B was banned, but its operations
continued underground. Early in July,
Makarios wrote to the president of
Greece demanding that the remaining
650 Greek officers assigned to the
National Guard be withdrawn. He also
accused the junta of plotting against
his life and against the government
of Cyprus. Makarios sent his letter
(which was released to the public)
to the Greek president on July 2,
1974; the reply came thirteen days
later, not in the form of a letter
but in an order from Athens to the
Cypriot National Guard to overthrow
its commander in chief and take control
of the island.
Makarios narrowly escaped death
in the attack by the Greek-led National
Guard. He fled the presidential palace
and went to Paphos. A British helicopter
took him the Sovereign Base Area
at Akrotiri, from where he went to
London. Several days later, Makarios
addressed a meeting of the UN Security
Council, where he was accepted as
the legal president of the Republic
of Cyprus.
In the meantime, the notorious EOKA
terrorist Nicos Sampson was declared
provisional president of the new
government. It was obvious to Ankara
that Athens was behind the coup,
and major elements of the Turkish
armed forces went on alert. Turkey
had made similar moves in 1964 and
1967, but had not invaded. At the
same time, Turkish prime minister
Bülent Ecevit flew to London
to elicit British aid in a joint
effort in Cyprus, as called for in
the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee, but
the British were either unwilling
or unprepared and declined to take
action as a guarantor power. The
United States took no action to bolster
the Makarios government, but Joseph
J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs, went to London
and the eastern Mediterranean to
stave off the impending Turkish invasion
and the war between Greece and Turkey
that might follow. The Turks demanded
removal of Nicos Sampson and the
Greek officers from the National
Guard and a binding guarantee of
Cypriot independence. Sampson, of
course, was expendable to the Athens
regime, but Sisco could get an agreement
only to reassign the 650 Greek officers.
As Sisco negotiated in Athens, Turkish
invasion ships were already at sea.
A last-minute reversal might have
been possible had the Greeks made
concessions, but they did not. The
intervention began early on July
20, 1974. Three days later the Greek
junta collapsed in Athens, Sampson
resigned in Nicosia, and the threat
of war between NATO allies was over,
but the Turkish army was on Cyprus.
Konstantinos Karamanlis, in self-imposed
exile in France since 1963, was called
back, to head the Greek government
once more. Clerides was sworn in
as acting president of the Republic
of Cyprus, and the foreign ministers
of the guarantor powers met in Geneva
on July 25 to discuss the military
situation on the island. Prime Minister
Ecevit publicly welcomed the change
of government in Greece and seemed
genuinely interested in eliminating
the tensions that had brought the
two countries so close to war. Nevertheless,
during the truce that was arranged,
Turkish forces continued to take
territory, to improve their positions,
and to build up their supplies of
war matériel.
A second conference in Geneva began
on August 10, with Clerides and Denktas
as the Cypriot representatives. Denktas
proposed a bizonal federation, with
Turkish Cypriots controlling 34 percent
of island. When this proposal was
rejected, the Turkish foreign minister
proposed a Turkish Cypriot zone in
the northern part of the island and
five Turkish Cypriot enclaves elsewhere,
all of which would amount once again
to 34 percent of the island's area.
Clerides asked for a recess of thirty-six
to forty-eight hours to consult with
the government in Nicosia and with
Makarios in London. His request was
refused, and early on August 14 the
second phase of the Turkish intervention
began. Two days later, after having
seized 37 percent of the island above
what the Turks called the "Atilla
Line," the line that ran from Morphou
Bay in the northwest to Famagusta
(Gazimagusa) in the east, the Turks
ordered a ceasefire .
